The Effects of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on Transatlantic Relationships

By The Change Lab

-

Russia’s war against Ukraine has reinvigorated the transatlantic relationship after several years in which policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic worried about a slow and complex drift apart. Perhaps for most national capitals on both sides of the Atlantic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine did not come as a complete surprise; but it was hoped that diplomacy would turn the tide or at least buy time for the Russian President Vladimir Putin to change his mind. Thus, during the run-up to the war, European powers-particularly French leaders-have courageously but unsuccessfully attempted to reverse Russia’s plans. Various intelligence services differed on their perception of the timing of Russia’s attack. Whereas some continental European intelligence services even doubted that Russia would go to war at all, their Britain and American counterparts had fewer doubts about Putin’s intentions. At last, the latter proved to be right and on 24th February 2022, a massive Russian attack was launched on Ukraine. 

Russia’s attack on Ukraine was to spark a number of consequences in European international affairs. Inevitably, the crisis in Ukraine resulted in escalating tension between the West and Russia and brought about a confrontational, anti-Kremlin mood in the transatlantic community. Numerous western sanctions as a way of condemnation of Russia actions could hardly have come as a surprise to Moscow. Arguably, Germany was impacted more than any other EU member states by the Ukrainian war, which led to the “Zeitenwende”, a fundamental orientation in German foreign, defense, and economic relationship with Russia. Germany’s voluntary severance from Russian gas and trade exemplified the radical measures undertaken and highlighted the profound impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on its economy. Furthermore, the lack of political support from the non-Western world for the Western vocalisation against Russia illustrated the changed global strategic landscape in this century. Today, the Global South are no longer reliant upon ‘Western-style’ political leadership and direction. 

Whether this new global order will be one that’s multipolar, partly unipolar, or a Chinese order remains uncertain. The same uncertainty prevails regarding the direction and character of the already very complex transatlantic relationship. At the turn of the 21st century, the transatlantic relationship has become increasingly and undoubtedly more politically fragmented. The Iraq War of 2003 exposed the differences on issues of values and threat perceptions and relationship reached an all time low. This visible divergence continued under President Obama. The ‘pivot to Asia’ strategy was not well understood in Europe-nor was it in the US. European-American tensions over the Middle East, and particularly the Syrian conflict, reflected the U.S. “pivoting” away from Europe. From the American perspective, three issues stood out: Germany’s reliance on Russian energy through Nord Stream, Merkel’s continued friendly approach toward Moscow, and Europe’s failure to meet NATO’s 2% defense spending target from the 2014 summit-all of which sparked U.S. frustration over Europe’s dependency.

These strains intensified under President Trump, whose “America First” stance and dismissive remarks about NATO unsettled European allies. Yet NATO weathered this period better than expected, largely thanks to Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s skillful diplomacy. He turned Trump’s pro-Russia impulses and transformed his burden-sharing complaints into momentum for higher European defense spending.

President Biden sought to renew transatlantic ties, but his efforts were disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to uncoordinated national responses. Meanwhile, U.S. foreign policy remained centered on China, whom they viewed as their primary global rival. 

The Ukraine-Russian war was to exacerbate the drift. The Strategic Vision(2012) study argued that Ukraine is among the most geopolitically endangered states in the world. According to Brzezinsky, Ukraine was likely to turn into another one of Russia's vassal states without US support which means Russia could then debilitate NATO and the EU through political influence. Thus, immediately after Russia’s full scale attack, NATO made it clear that Russia had crossed a red line. NATO allies instantly increased weapons deliveries to Ukraine whilst reinforcing its sensible posture across the entire eastern flank. For the first time ever, NATO’s response Force was activated with the French military deployed at the forefront of Romania. The US succeeded in forging a coalition of Western Countries-the Ukraine Defence Contact group-to demonstrate US leadership in NATO in the face of the Ukraine war. Another indication of US leadership has been the US’s ability to convince Germany to change course regarding the important issue of sending to Ukraine heavy weaponries such as tanks and anti-aircraft missiles etc. The US led this effort on behalf of the EU.The Berlin-Washington axis modestly revived through “close coordination,” with US leadership in NATO driving a united stance against Russia, stronger deterrence, and enhanced European defense. 

Before the Madrid summit, Ukraine’s NATO membership had already divided allies at Bucharest in 2008, when US ambitions clashed with Franco-German caution. After Russia’s invasion, the issue re-emerged but full membership was ruled out due to the risk of triggering Article 5. The 2023 Vilnius summit repeated Bucharest’s vague promise that Ukraine “will become a member,” offering only to drop the pre-entry Membership Action Plan.

NATO’s new defense buildup spurred long-overdue European rearmament, with Germany pledging major investments yet still deferring to US leadership—most notably in its tank deliveries to Ukraine. Meanwhile, dissent within NATO has been minimal: Hungary and Turkey, often disruptive in EU politics, fell in line under US influence, with Ankara placated by F-16 offers.

Despite Macron’s 2019 claim that NATO faced “brain death,” the alliance has stayed united through the Ukraine war—largely because American leadership remains its lifeline.

In 1990, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner urged a stronger, more united Europe—one with its own defense identity within the Atlantic framework. Yet decades later, the transatlantic relationship remains unequal. While Europe has caught up economically, its defense capabilities lag far behind. As NATO’s Stoltenberg bluntly stated in 2021, “The EU cannot defend Europe.”

The Ukraine war briefly unified the EU, exposing both resilience and dependence: Europe rallied politically and militarily behind Ukraine, but under clear US leadership. Talk of “strategic autonomy” thus rings hollow when Europe still leans on the American security umbrella. Without it, the continent might face the grim choice of engaging Russia anew.

For now, Europe remains a junior partner in its own defense—a powerful alliance, but not a balanced one. And until Europe matches its economic strength with military resolve, true autonomy will remain an aspiration, not a reality.

-